Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 17

Issue 4

Article 7

1929

Case Comments
Kentucky Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Kentucky Law Journal (1929) "Case Comments," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 17: Iss. 4, Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol17/iss4/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CASE COMMENTS
BILTS AND NoTEs-PuRcHAs'iPs RzuD.ATioxI or INDEBTEDNESS O1
PuRcHAsE-MoNEY NOTE HELD NOT To AcoELRATr.
MonIT.-Plaintiffs sold defendants a farm and accepted a note for a part of the purchase-money which note was due in ten years. At the end of three
years the defendants abandoned the farm and left the state with no
intention of ever trying to pay the note. Held, this did not accelerate
maturity. Huffman et at. v. Martin et at., 226 Ky. 137, 10 (2nd) S. W.
636.
The present point of law does not appear to have been before the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky until this case was presented. The court
adopted the rule that where a contract to pay money is executed on one
side but wholly executory on the other no action will lie until the time
of payment arrives even though the debtor gives notice that he will not
meet his obligation when it is due. The court in the course of its
opinion says this rule is based on sound legal principles.
The rule is well settled and has been applied many times in the
Federal courts. W. county sold bonds the date of payment being specified and the fund out of which they should be paid would be raised by
a certain assessment. As this assessment was not made the county was
unable to meet its obligation. Held, no action would lie until the due
date of the bonds. Washington Co. v. Williams, 111 Fed. 801, 49 C. C.
A. 621. While speaking of a contract to pay money the court said, ';No
action for damages lies before the time of payment arrives against one
who disables himself from paying or gives*notice that he will not pay,
his obligations under contracts of this kind." Moore v. Security Trust
and Life Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496. Chief Justice Taney sitting on circuit
in Maryland in 1851, said, "It has never been supposed that notice to
the holder of a bond, or a promissory note, or bill of exchange, that the
party would not (from any cause) comply with the contract, would
give to the holder an immediate cause of action upon which he might
sue before the time of payment arrived." Greenway v. Gaither, 227
Fed. Cas. No. 5,788. The same view is expressed in Boehm v. Horst,
178 U. S. 1, 44 L. Ed. 953.
New York followed the Federal rule and incidentally the view In
the principal case in Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 487, 33 N.
E. 566. Massachusetts even goes to the extent of not allowing a present action in the case of notice of breach of an ordinary contract on
the theory that this would necessitate its adoption in the case of commercial paper. Daniels v. Newton, 144 Mass. 530. The date of maturity of notes was not accelerated by the sale of land under a statute
to prevent the property from being wasted. Haggard v. fanglin, 69
Wash. 151, 124 P. 373. See 13 C. J., p. 655, notes 75, 76 and 77 for additional authority.
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While there is not voluminous authority on the question at issue
those courts which have passed upon it have held in accord with the
G. C. R.
principal case.

BROEs-RELATION OF DEBTOR AND CREDITOR EXISTs BETwzEEi

Cus-

TOMER AND BROKER ON PURCHAS E OF STOCK ON MARGIN AS TO PORTION OF
PURCASE PRICE ADVATCED BY BROKER, BUT STOCK BELONGS TO CUSTOMIER,
SUBJECT TO BRoKER'S LIm.-Plaintiff placed an order with defendant's
assignor in insolvency, a stock broker, for the purchase, on margin,
of 100 shares each of two specified stocks. The stocks were bought and
plaintiff put up as collateral security 100 shares of "H" stock, 40 shares
of "C," and 10 of "D," later on demand ten additional shares of "D."
Plaintiff was then given a statement showing that the stocks were being
held for him. Later the principal member of the firm absconded and
defendant was appointed receiver. The two hundred shares were sold
and more than enough realized to settle all accounts between plaintiff
and defendant. Upon demand for the return of the pledged stock the
defendant refused to return it on the ground that -thecollateral should
go to the general creditors. Held, that the broker had no money interest in the shares, that they were given to him for a specific use
which having been accomplished they must be returned. Further, that
the creditors could not complain since none of the assets of the firm
were in the collateral. Sargent v. Whitfield, 226 Ky. 754, 11 (2d) S.
W. 926.
The defendant here seized upon the Massachusetts rule in an attempt to evade the demand to return the collateral. The Massachusetts rule is well expressed in a note to Sackville v. Wimer, 41 A. L. .
1265; also Chase v. Boston, 180 Mass. 458, 62 N. E. 1059; Richardson v.
Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 52 L. Ed. 835. The rule is to the effect that the
relation between the parties is purely contractual, and the broker becomes the owner of the stock placed with him or purchased by him.
The rule though it is recognized in England is supported by no other
American authority.
The confusion upon this point is largely due to the complicated
nature of the relationship. In purchasing the stock the broker is an
agent, next a creditor if there is an advancement, and finally a pledgee
of such stock together with everything placed with him as collateral.
This confusion arises mainly where the lending of credit or money Is
given emphasis greater than the negotiation of the purchase. This
certainly accounts for the Massachusetts rule. The majority rule, however, seems to be more logical and better adapted to carry out the intent of the parties. Thus under the Massachusetts rule the broker
would be entitled to all dividends of the stock in his possession whether
as collateral or otherwise, and the burden of risk would also be upon
him. Under the majority rule the customer must properly stand
the risk and be entitled to the profits and dividends. It is to be noted
that the grant of right to repledge is not inconsistent since it is always
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understood that the broker remain ready-to return the same or similar
stock upon settlement or demand. Hadfield v. Tracey, 101 Conn. 181,
125 Atl. 199, 34 L. R. A. 581; In Re Mercantile Trust Co., 210 N. Y. 83,
101 N. B. 804; Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 519, 52 L.
Ed. 835. Mr. Justice Holmes in the latter case decided with the majority, though with "lingering doubts," while in Chase v. Boston, supra, he
W. H. C.
was entirely in accord with the rule of that state.

CoRPoRTIoNs-STocKnoLDERs
Tim ConeoRATIoN Pop. VALuEa

AnE LABE

To UNPAID

CRmIToRs

or

oF CoRPonATE AssETs WRoNGruLLY REcEivE.

-The H. Water Company sold all its property to a municipality, which
paid full purchase price and took possession. The company after paying certain obligations, leaving unpaid the debt of the plaintiff, divided
the money so realized among its stockholders. The plaintiff sued the
water company but on finding it execution proof brought this action to
charge the stockholders with personal liability. Held, stockholders
are personally liable to unpaid creditors of the corporation for value
of corporate assets wrongfully received. Wallace & Tierman Company
v. Davis et al., 227 Ky. 71, 11 (2d) S. W. 990.
The Kentucky court has repeatedly sanctioned the well established
rule that the corporation may recover corporate assets, which have been
distributed among its stockholders, even though the distribution was
authorized by the stockholders as a body, under the mistaken belief
that sufficient assets remained to take care of the corporate liabilities.
Grant v. Ross, 101 Ky. 44, 37 S. W. 263.
The New York court has declared that where the stockholders are
in actual possession and have under their immediate control the property of the corporation, they are trustees of the creditors of the corporation in respect to such property and are liable to the creditors for any
act done in disposing of the property which results in injury to them.
Grayham .v. Hoy, 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. (6 Jones & S.) 506. While the
fact that the disposal was in a perfectly valid manner and passed good
title to the vendees as against the stockholders' company, and its creditors, it does not relieve the stockholders from either joint or several
liability. Chicago, etc. R. R. Company v. Howard, 7 Wall (U. S.) 392,
19 L. Ed. 117.
Under the above mentioned circumstances the courts are virtually
agreed that the liability of the stockholders is co-extensive with the
corporate assets received by them, or so much thereof as may be necessary to liquidate outstanding indebtedness. McLean v. Moore, (Texas
Civ. App.) 145 S. W. 1074; Adams v. Perryman & Company, 80 So. 853.
Creditors must however exhaust their remedies against the corporation
before proceeding against the stockholders personally. Weil v. Detenback, 31 Idaho 258, 170 Pac. 103.
This rule of the principal case is so well established in Kentucky,
and the reasons for its existence so cogent as to admit of little doubt.
Gratz v. Redd, 4 B. Monroe, 178; Grant v. Southern Contracts Corn-
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pany, 104 Ky. 781, 47 S. W. 1091; Martin v. City of Lexington, 183
Ky. 715, 210 S. W. 484; American Steel and Wire Company v. Eddy,
138 Mich. 403, 101 N. W. 578; Fricke v. Angemeier, 53 Ind. App. 140, 101
J. C. B.
X. E. 329.

Cov=Anms-UsE OF LoTs By PATRONS OF ROADHOusE As PARKnG
PLAcm FOR AuromomLs HELD ron "Busrsss PuxiosEs," n VIOLAT:ON
or REsTIonvE CovFmNAT..-Grantor conveyed to grantee three lots adjacent to his roadhouse, one of which the latter had been using as a
parking space for automobiles and all of which were so used after the
conveyance. There was a restrictive covenant in the deed which read,
"No trade or business whatever shall be permitted or maintained on
this property." Held, the parking of automobiles came within this covenant. Bennet v. Consolidated Realty Co., 226 Ky. 747, 11 (2nd) S. W.
910.
The words in the deed were interpreted in their fair and natural
meaning and the Intention of the grantor was sought by such a conSpurrier's Heirs v. Parker, 16 B. Monroe 274, is also
struction.
analogous. The deed stated that the grantee bank had undertaken to
pay the "accruing taxes." The question raised was whether this included the Federal income tax. The court said, "In order to determine
the scope and extent of that obligation we must consider, first, the
natural import of the language used, and then read that In the light
of the circumstances under which it was used." iational Bank v.
Minary, 221 Ky. 798, 299 S. W. 985.
There appears to be a single theory throughout the Kentucky cases
that restrictive covenants are not construed to create restrictions
beyond the fair and natural meaning of the words used under the existIng circumstances. It is probable that the grantor had this use of
parking in mind when he placed the restrictive covenant in the deed.
This rule appears to be well settled in the other jurisdictions. A
covenant provided that there should not be placed on the premises a
livery stable, blacksmith shop, furnace, brewery, theatre, circus or any
other business offensive or dangerous to the neighboring inhabitants,
but the court held that the use of the property as a home for the aged
and orphans did not come within this covenant. Easterbrookv. Hebrew
Ladies' Orpian Society, 85 Conn. 289, 82 At. 561. This case adopts
the rule of the principal case. By reading the businesses which were
prohibited it is clear that the grantor did not intend to restrict the use
of the property as a home for the aged and orphans because such would
not be offensive or dangerous to the neighboring inhabitants. The lot
was granted with a covenant that it would only be used for residential
purposes. A right of way was granted to one living beyond the block.
Held, this was a violation of the covenant. Klopproth v. Grininger,162
Minn. 488, 203 N. W. 418. Akcovenant which restricted the use of property to residential purposes was held to be violated when the grantee
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established a private school, charging tuition and hiring teachers. Hart
v. Little, 171 N. Y. S. 6, 103 Misc. Rep. 620.
After a careful review of the authorities there appears to be a long
line of decisions supporting the principal case. It is also sound from
the standpoint of reason and the result is practical.
G. C. R.
CRinnqA.

LAw-AQuiTTAL IS

NO BAR, UNDER KENTUOxY

CoNsTn'u-

TION,"SECmON 13, To PROSECUTION OF A LEssER CRImE, OF WHICH DEFEND-

ANT COULD NOT H.nv BEEN CONVICTED UNDER THE FIRST INDIcTMET.Appellee was indicted for two offenses. First, for unlawfully manufacturing whisky. Secondly, for unlawfully possessing a still. The information upon which the indictments were predictated happened
simultaneously and was closely connected by circumstances. Appellee
was acquitted on the first indictment. At the trial for the second
offense the former judgment was plead in bar; it being claimed that to
entertain such action would be putting appellee in double jeopardy
contrary to the constitution. Held, that the indictment would lie; that
the former action did not jeopardize for the latter offense. Commonwealth v. Laudsan, 226 Ky. 386, 10 (2nd) S. W. 1089.
Putting in jeopardy in a former action is not a bar to a subsequent
action, merely because the facts upon which the charges are predicated
are so closely connected in point of time and circumstances that it is
impossible to separate the evidence relating to them. Hughes v. Cormmonwealth, 131 Ky. 502, 115 S. W. 744; Mann v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky.
67, 80 S. W. 438; Flemisterv. United States, 207 U. S. 372, 28 S. Ct. 129;
Winn v. State, 82 Wis. 571, 52 N. W. 775.
Kentucky, in accord with the majority of the jurisdictions of the
United States, follows the "same evidence" rule. In Scope v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 835, 243 S. W. 1036, the rule was stated as follows:
"When the facts necessary to convict on the second indictment would
necessarily have convicted on the first, a final judgment on the first
would be a bar to the second."
The test of former jeopardy may be summed up in two questions.
First, could the culprit have been convicted for the latter offense under
the former indictment? Second, would the evidence necessary to convict in the latter charge have sustained the prior indictment? The
majority and better rule is that if these queries are answered in the
negative the former judgment will not be a putting in jeopardy for the
second offense, within the meaning of the constitution. Bishop on
Criminal Law, sec. 1062; Graves v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 31 S. Ct.
421; Ryan v. United States, 216 Fed. 13; Mary v. Commonwealth, 108
Mass. 433; State v. Howe, 27 Or. 138, 44 P. 672; Scory v. Commonwealth,
195 Ky. 835, 243 S.. W. 1036; Walace v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 627,
249 S. W. 776.
The instant holding seems sound in the light of the foregoing test.
The offenses of unlawfully manufacturing whisky and unlawfully possessing a still are separate and distinct violations of the law. Each is
imposed by a different and distinct statute. Hence, indictment in one

CASE COMMENTS

Instance would not warrant conviction in the other. The evidence necessary to conviction under an indictment for unlawfully manufacturing
whisky is vastly different from that necessary for conviction upon an
indictment for unlawfully possessing a still. In the former, evidence
establishing "actual participation in the distilling of liquor" is the
test-possession of a still is not determinative. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 389, 276 S. W. 850; Leidy v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky.
628, 294 S. W. 164. In the latter, evidence proving "possession of a
still which is not registered in the office of internal revenue of the
United States" is the test of guilt. Roberts v. Commonwealth, 199
Ky. 23, 250 S. W. 130.
It has been held that conviction for illegally registering is not a
bar to an action upon an indictment for false swearing in the consumation of such'registration, Hughes v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 503, 115
S. W. 744; that acquittal upon an indictment for breaking into a store
house with intent to steal was not a bar to an action on an indictment,
predicated upon the same facts, for breaking into a dwelling house with
a like intent, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 150 Ky. 347, 150 S. W. 376;
that acquittal on an indictment for carnally knowing a female under
16 years of age was not a bar to an action for unlawfully detaining a
woman with intent to have carnal knowledge of her. though the second
Indictment was upon the same facts, Head v. Commonwealth, 174 Ky.
481, 192 S. W. 861; that indictment and conviction for unlawfully possessing whisky is not a bar to a subsequent action for selling the same
whisky, O'Conner v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 673, 197 S. W. 405; that
conviction for contempt of court was not an exemption from an action
for assault and battery growing out of the same proceedings, Bory v.
Commonwealth, 177 Ky. 391, 197 S. W. 843; that an acquittal upon an
indictment for unlawfully giving whisky away is not a bar to an action
for unlawfully possessing the same whisky, Mullins v. Commonwealth,
216 Ky. 182, 286 S. W. 1042.
C. S. M.

CRI-nINAL LAw-REVIEWING

COURT WILL

NOT

INTERFERE

WITH

Juny's VERDIcT UN-LEss PALPABLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE,

291,
As AwENDED IN 1910.--Appellant was indicted for maliciously cutting
with intent to kill. The Commonwealth presented five witnesses whose
testimony tended, to prove that appellant acted without provocation
or cause. Appellant, the only witness for the defense, testified that his
approach was in self-defense. There was a verdict of guilty. Appellant alleged as error "a verdict contrary to the evidence." Held, that
there was a conflict in the evidence, and that it was the province of the
jury to pass upon and determine the credit to be given same; that the
appellate court will not reverse a judgment in a criminal case unless
the verdict upon which it was entered is palpably against the weight
of the evidence, or result of passion and prejudice. Brown v. Conmonwealth, 226 Ky. 255, 10 (2d) S. W. 820.
OR RESULT OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE-CRMINAL CODE OF PRACTICE
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Kentucky Criminal Code of Practice, See. 340, has been interpreted
to authorize the appellate court to review; not whether there is sufflcient evidence to sustain a verdict, but whether there is any evidence
tending to prove the facts in issue. Pinkston v. Commonwealth, 138
Ky. 25, 127 S. W. 493; Tipper v. Commonwealth, 1 Metc. 6; Vowels v.
Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 193. The section of the Criminal Code of Practice relied upon by the court in the instant case has been construed to
enlarge the jurisdiction conferred by section 340, to include in review
aspects of passion, prejudice, and palpable misjudgment of the jury.
Without one of these elements a reversal is not warranted. Drake v.
Drake, 107 Ky. 32, 56 S. W. 846; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 361,
130 S. W. 793; Chaney v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 464, 149 S. W. 923;
Black v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 144, 164 S. W. 1043; Kirk v. Common.
wealth, 192 Ky. 460, 233 S. W. 1060.
In the case of Chaney v. Commonwealth, supra, the court held that,
"There was ample testimony, if believed, to sustain the conviction.
Unfortunately for defendant we are limited to whether the verdict is
-palpably against the evidence. We are not permitted to review the
credibility of the witness, that is for the jury. We are but reviewers,
not triers; and, when a jury sends one of its fellow cltiens to the
-penitentiary upon incredible testimony, the convict must look for relief
to those, who under the law of our land, have the right -to grant relief
-- a province which the court has no right to invade, a function which
it will not usurp." In this case the court recognized the injustice of
the decision, but it also recognized that to grant relief would be to pass
upon the credibility of -the evidence, a role which it clearly declined to
assume, "even though in its opinion a wrong conclusion was being
effected."
Another case in which the Kentucky court affirmed -the judgment
entered upon a verdict, on which, upon the evidence adduced, it did not
concur, was: Spicer v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 395, 272 S. W. 709. In
Begley v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 747, 276 S. W. 834, a recent case, it
was held that a reversal upon an incongruous verdict would only be
granted when the verdict was so much againt the evidence that it
shocked the conscience and clearly appeared to be the result of passion
and prejudice.
The view expressed by the Instant case is almost unanimously adhered to throughout the United States. The verdict of the jury will
not be disturbed in criminal cases, on appeal, except for entire lack of
evidence. Talbert v. United,States, 6 F. (2nd) 570. Erroneous verdict
of a jury does not constitute a reversible, error, State v. Oliver, 130 A.
446; nor does evidence upon which different inferences may be drawn,
Kirk v. State, 241 P. 205. On the other hand, a new trial was granted
upon circumstantial evidence, which was conflicting and insufficient to
support the verdict. State v. Scurloch, 130 S. E. 263. Where there is
some evidence, however weak, inconclusive, and unsatisfactory, from
which inference sustaining the verdict might have been drawn, the ap-

CASE COMMENTS
pellate court will not reverse it as being against the evidence. Covington
v. State, 104 So. 341. Questions of fact, credibility of witnesses, weight
to be given testimony, are exclusively for the jury, and if so determined,
the appellate court will not reverse because the testimony is suceptible
of two reasonable inferences. People v. Chesney, 72 Col. App. 570, 237
P. 793.
There can be no doubt that the instant court, in its holding, followed the almost unanimous view of the various jurisdictions of the
United States, and an unbroken line of Kentucky authority upon which
the decision was based. The conclusion is inevitable if the jury is to
have a role in the final adjudication of criminal issues.
C. S. M.

DivoRo-WiF, CONTINUING TO LivE W=ITH HUSBAND DURING. Six
MoNTHs or CRuEL TnEATMENT REQUIRED To ExTiTIm HER To DIvORcE,
DoEs NoT CoNxoNE SUCH TREATMNT; "CoNDOATioN" (Ky. ST. SEC. 2117,
2120).-Plaintiff fied bill, seeking divorce on grounds of cruelty, by
virtue of Kentucky Statutes, Section 2117. In his answer the defendant
pleaded condonation by reason of cohabitation with him as his wife for
a long time after the alleged acts set out in the petition. The clearly
established facts are that for about a year previous to suit the defendant had been very cruel to plaintiff, had beaten her and tried to force
her to leave their house. She was finally required to leave by the defendant and forthwith brought this bill. The lower court dismissed
plaintiff's petition and she appealed. Held, that plaintiff's petition
should have been granted; that her continuing with the defendant
during his cruel treatment of her was not a condonation of his behavior. Meyer v. Meyer, 226 Ky. 278, 10 (2d) S. W. 844.
Kentucky Statutes, Sec. 2117, upon which plaintiff based her petition, provides: "Courts may grant a divorce . . . to the wife . . .
for the following causes . . . 2. Habitually behaving toward her by
the husband, for not less than six months, in such cruel and inhuman
manner as to indicate a settled aversion to her, or to destroy perman.
ently her peace or happiness. 3. Such cruel beating or injury, or attempt at injury, of the wife by her husband, as indicates an outrageous
temper In him, or probable danger to her life, or great bodily injury
from her remaining with him."
It is obvious that Kentucky Statutes, Section 2120 which provides,
"Cohabitation as man and wife, after a knowledge of adultery or lewdness complained of, shall take away the right of divorce therefor," can
not be set up as a defense for the reason that divorce was not sought
on grounds of adultery or lewdness.
Condonation has been defined to be the forgiveness, either express
or implied, by a husband of his wife, or by a wife of her husband, for
a breach of marital duty, with an implied condition that the offense
shall not be repeated. Davis v. Davis, 134 Ga. 804, 68 S. E. 594, 30 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 73; Camming v. Cumming, 153 Mass. 386, 46 Am. Rep.
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476. And Tiffany on Domestic Relations, (3rd Ed.) Sec. 107, says,
"Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for divorce, and bars the right to a divorce. But condonation
is on the condition, implied by law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again commit that offense, and also that he shall thereafter treat the other with 'conjugal kindness' and a breach of the condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce."
Voluntary cohabitation is generally held to be proof of condonation
but it will npt necessarily be implied from the fact that the husband
and wife continued to live together if there was no sexual intercourse.
Tiffany on Dom. Rel. (3rd Ed.) Sec. 108. Because of the dependent
position of the wife, condonation will not be so readily inferred from
conduct against her as it would be against the husband. Gardner v.
Gardmer, 2 Gray (Mass.) 434; Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 108;
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 32 Miss. 279.
However, the presumption of condonation from cohabitation in
cases of cruelty is not so strong as in cases of adultery. 2 Bishop on
Marriage and Divorce, Sec. 50. But the doctrine of condonation applies as well to cruelty and other grounds of divorce as to adultery;
the difference being that an act of cruelty is condoned only until the
particular act is repeated. Bingham v. Bingham, 149 S. W. 214; Nogees v. Nogees, 7 Tex. 538, 58 Am. Dec. 78.
In the principal case the cruel treatment complained of co'ntinued
for approximately a year before the plaintiff left her husband and
brought suit. The case of Buckley v. Buckley, 214 Ky. 566, 283 S. IV.
1031, upon the authority of which the lower court dismissed plaintiff's
petition, may be distinguished from the principal case in that there
the parties separated and were living apart for some time before they
became reconciled and went back to living together, and that upon the
second separation the court found each was as much to blame as the
other.
It ssems to be the well settled rule, in the absence of statute, that
where the cruelty consists of a series of wrongs, no cne of which would
perhaps in itself be ground for divorce, mere cohabitation during the
period in which the acts are committed in the hope of better treatment
in the future, does not constitute condonation. Reese v. Reese, 23 Ala.
785; Phillips v. Phillips, 1 Ill. App. 245; Breedlove v. Breedlove, 27 Ind.
App. 560, 61 N. E. 797; Austin v. Austin, 172 Mich. 620, 138 N. W. 215;
Mandelin v. Mandcelin, 120 Minn. 193, 139 N. W. 152; Bliss v. Bliss, 161
Mo. App. 70, 142 S. W. 1081. All efforts at conciliation should be encouraged and where a strong case of cruelty on the part of the husband
is made out, a divorce should not be denied on the grounds of condonation merely because the wife has made several efforts to get along with
the husband.
The writer has been unable to locate previous Kentucky decisions
precisely in point. The case of Hooe v. Hooe, 122 Ky. 594, 92 S. W.
318, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729, 13 Ann. Cas. 214, cited in the principal case,
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is a leading one and contains an authoritative discussion of "continued
mistreatment."
It is sufficient to say that the decision of the case at bar is in line
with the weight of authority. Quient v. Quient, 105 Wash. 315, 177
Pac. 779; Hansen v. Hansen, 261 Pac. 503;.Fisherv. Fisher, 227 N. Y.
S. 345, 223 App. Div. 19; Doose v. Doose, 198 Ill. App.. 387; Hickman
v. Hickman, 188 Ia. 697, 176 N. W. 698, 14 A. L. R. 929.
C. E. B.

EVIDENCE-PAROL EVIDENCE IS ADxSsIBLn TO PROVE CONDITIONAL
DELIvERY OF A NOTE, SUCu BEING PRECEDENT TO ITs TAKING EFFEcT.
Suit on promissory note. Defendant admitted execution of the note
but contends that it was given in exchange for a check which he had
formerly given plaintiff, and it was orally agreed at the time that the
check was not to be paid unless pending negotiations between them
should materialize. These contingencies never happened. There is
no allegation of fraud or mistake on or by either party and defendant
relies wholly on this contemporaneous oral agreement.
Held, parol evidence not admissible to show the contemporaneous
oral agreement, since this was not a condition precedent to the note's
taking effect, but title passed at once. Barrett v. Clark-, 226 Ky. 109,
9 (2d) S. W. 1091.
Since the note was complete on its face and purported to set forth
the entire contract, the court declared the above mentioned stipulations
to be conditions subsequent. The proffered evidence was, therefore,
clearly an attempt to vary the terms of a written instrument by parol.
The rule is well settled, in Kentucky, that parol evidence may be introduced to establish a conditional delivery, but if the contingency, sought
to be proved, relates to matters arising subsequent to the execution of
the note, parol evidence is not admissible. Pickerefl v. Wilson, 199 Ky.
20, 250 S. W. 135; Mercer-Lincoln Pineknob Co. v. Pruett, 191 .Xy. 240,
229 S. W. 374.
In Simpson v. Blaine, 191 Ky. 465, 230 S. W. 934, the court held
that a prior or contemporaneous parol agreement varying or altering
the terms of a promissory note could not be introduced unless, "the
terms of the contract as written and executed are different from the
terms of the actual contract which was intended to be entered into and
that the execution of it, as written, was either caused by the fraud of
the one, by mistake on the part of the one and fraud of the other or
by the mutual mistake of both." This rule finds ample justification in
the following cases: Dale v. Pope, 4 Litt. 166; Williams v. Beaze?y, 3
J. J. Mar. 577; Citizens' Bank v. Mellitt, 103 Ky. 1, 44 S. W. 366, 20 Ky.
Law Rep. 5, 44 L. R. A. 664, 82 Am. Stat. Rep. 546; Castleman, Blake.
more V. Pickrell, 163 Ky. 750, 174 S. W. 749; Fairbanks-Morse& Co.
v. Manning, 164 Ky. 478, 175 S. W . 1000; Kreitz v. Galberstein,170 Ky.
16, 185 S. W. 132.
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Since there are no allegations made in the instant case, which
would bring it within the well recognized exceptions noted above, it
must fall within the general rule laid down in Tross v. Dill's Executrix, 189 Ky. 115, 224 S. W. 666: "It is the rule in this state that where
by writing there is an unqualified promise to pay, parol evidence Is not
admissible to contradict the terms of the writing, unless the writing
shows on its face that it is only a part of the contract between the
parties."
Although there is considerable conflict in authority as to the admissibility of such evidence the following jurisdictions are in accord
with Kentucky: Thompson v. Citizens' Bank, 144 Ga. 10, 85 S. E. 1002;
Probas Co. v. Shaw, 144 Ga. 416, 87 S. U. 466; Croan v. Myers, 52 Ind.
App. 143, 100 N. E. 380; FederalDiscount Co. v. Fletcher & Ratliff, 104
Miss. 251, 61 So. 308; Citizens' Basic v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 194, 156
S. W. 488; Carganie Trust Co. v. Rudolph Kleybote & Co., 134 N. Y. S.
69.
J. C. B.
FRAD"-PROHASEB M.AY 3 BOUND OTTCONTRACT TO VENDORS AND
STiLL HAVE A CAUSE OF AcTION IN DECEiT AGAINST BRoKER OTAININO
CONTRACT. Plaintiffs claim that they were induced to sign a contract
calling for the sale of certain real estate without reading the contract
because of the fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant, a real
estate agent, as to the contents of the same. Plaintiffs bring this action
in deceit to recover the money which they had paid on the contract.
Held, that purchasers may be bound on a contract and still have a cause
of action sounding in deceit against a third party who by his actionable misrepresentations got them so bound. Kreate v. Miller, et al.,
226 Ky. 444, 11 (2nd) S. W. 99.
The doctrine of the instant case is in accord with the weight of
authority in a majority of the states and lines up with the recognized
doctrine of the federal jurisdictions, as it is now generally held that
where a party has been induced to sign a contract thru fraud, he may
elect to stand on the contract and sue the fraud feasor for damages or
he may rescind the contract. T. B. Potter Realty Co. v. Breitling, 79
Or. 293, 155 P. 179; Modlin v. Roanoke Ry. Co., 145 N. C. 218, 58 S. E.
1075; West v. Carter, 54 Wash. 236, 103 P. 21; Day v. Steverson, 145
S. W. 1062. A party has the election as to which course he shall pursue and at no time will the law make the election for him. United
States Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago Transfer Co., 188 Fed. 292,
110 C. C. A. 219.
The United States Supreme Court rule seems to be well expressed
in the case of Cheny v. Dickinson, 172 Fed. 109, 96 0. C. A. 314, 28 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 359. In handing down the decision the court said: "A
person who finds that he has parted with money through being fraudulently led into a purchase may pursue either one of two remedies at
law. He may repudiate the purchase, surrender the property to the
vendor and recover the consideration. Or he may affirm and abide by
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the purchase, retain the property, and recover the difference between

what he paid and the value of what he has received and is retaining.
Such an action can be maintained against anyone (vendor or third
party, indifferently) who intentionally deceived the plaintiff into
making the purchase." The rule laid down in this case as to the measure of damages accords with the general weight of authority. Larme
v. Barber, 154 Ky. 354, 212 S. W. 142; Bechel v. Chase, 156 Cal. 707,196
P. 81; Day v. Steverson, 145 S. W. 1062.
A party cannot sue for deceit and at the same time rescind the
contract. Church v. Baumgardner, 46 Ind. App. 570, 92 N. E. 7. The
bringing of an action for deceit has generally been held to amount to
a ratification of the contract. Ligon v. Menton, 125 S. W. 305; Kern
merer v. Pollard, 15 Idaho 34, 96 P. 206; Krause v. Busacker, 81 N. W.
406. In one case it was held that where the deceit complane-d of was
in the method of payment and not in the contract of sale that the plaintiff could affirm the contract and sue in damages for the deceit. Benton
v. Kuykendall, 160 S. W. 438.
The rule in the present case represents the almost uncontradicted
weight of authority and may well be defended both from the standpoint of reason and practicability.
E. E. A.
FRAUDS, STATUTE oF-PURcHAsER's AGENT SIGNING LETTER
ACCEPTING DEFENDANT'S OrrER TO TAKE OVER CONTRACT TO PURCHASE REALTY,
WAS NOT REQUImED TO HAvE Wn=RTN AUTHORITY FROM PRINCIPAL.

Plaintiff had a valid contract to purchase certain real estate for a specified sum. The defendant made a verbal offer to take over the contract
and pay the plaintiff $750.00 therefor. This offer was accepted by a
letter of the plaintiff's attorney to the defendant's agent and a leed
was made to the property in accordance with the agreement. Defendant refused to pay the $750.00 and the plaintiff brought an action to
recover that amount. Held, that the case did not come within the
Statute of Frauds. Benjamin v. Dinwiddie, 226 Ky. 106, 10 (2nd) S.W.
620.
The Kentucky rule, as applied in the instant case, is well expressed
in the case of Chambers v. Murphy, 192 Ky. 839, 234 S.W. 960. The
court said: "The statute requires the contract to be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged therewith or by his authorized agent.
Section 470, Kentucky Statutes. It has long been the settled rule that
an undisclosed principal may be held to a contract made in his behalf
by a duly authorized agent, and this rule was never changed by the
Statute of Frauds. Moreover, the agency may be established by parol
.testimony." It will be noted that this is a more extreme rule than is
necessary to justify the holding in the present case where the principal
was known. Other cases which sustain the rule are Talbot v. Bowen,
1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 436, 10 Am. Dec. 756; Jackson v. Murray, 5 T. B.
Mon. (Ky.) 184; Irvin v. Thompson, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 295.
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According to the great weight of authority, where the statute
merely requires that the contract be signed by the party to be charged
or his duly authorized agent, it is not necessary that the agent's
auhority be conferred in writing. Merritt v. Adams County Land Co.,
29 N. D. 496, 151 N. W. 11; Levine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P.
2; Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Payne, 164 S. W. 886. The Federal
courts are in accord with this view. Walker v. Hafer, 170 Fed. 37;
McCullough v. Sutherland, 153 Fed. 418. The basis of this rule seems
to be that the statute did not intend to change the law of agency unless
it expressly made that provision.
In many states it is expressly provided that in contracts of this
type the agent must be authorized in writing in order to bind his
principal by a memorandum signed by him. Alabama Ry. Co. v. Souther. Ry. Co., 84 Ala. 570, 3 So. 286; Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782,
106 P. 88; Llewellyn v. Sunnyside Coal Co., 242 Pa. 517, 89 A. 575;
Scheckinger v. Gault, 35 Okla. 416, 130 P. 305; Robarts v. Lombard, 152
P. 499, 78 Or. 100; Ross v. Craven, 84 Neb. 520, 121 N. W. 451. Such
provisions would seem to be in accord with the original purpose of the
Statute of Frauds and by requiring that the agent's authority should
be in writing it would appear that a door would be closed through
which at least some fraud would otherwise likely enter.
It may be seen from the authorities that the instant case merely
reiterated a well-established Kentucky rule and in doing so it concurred with the majority view under similar statutes. Although the
Federal rule as well as those of most of the states accord with the
Kentucky rule, a large minority of the states require the authority of
the agent in regard to contracts of this kind to be in writing and it
would seem that at the present time the tendency is in that direction.
E. E. A.
HOATICIDE--OrFIcEa

HAD No RIGHT TO KLL PERsoN

ARREST FOR MISDEMAEANOR

RESISTING

UNLEss RE..ISTANCF WAS BY ARMED FoRcE.

S., a deputy sheriff, was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to
serve six years in penitentiary under an indictment charging him with
the murder of B. while arresting him for a misdemeanor. The court
instructed the jury that if they believed "from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the deceased, B., committed the offense of being
drunk or carrying on or about'his person a concealed deadly weapon
in the presence of defendant, S., and that the defendant then and there
undertook to arrest him, and that deceased, B., resisted said arrest with
armed force if he did so, and it was necessary or believed by the defendant In the exercise of a reasonable judgment, to be necessary to compel
the deceased to submit to arrest to shoot and kill the deceased, the
killing was excusable and you will find defendant not guilty." Exception was taken to the world "armed" used. Held, "armed" was properly used, for this was a misdemeanor. Shelton v. Commonwealth, 226
Ky. 444, 11 (2d) S. W. 125.
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The Kentucky view on the point in question has been uniform since
its first application. It looks to the common law for guidance. The
rule at common law was that an officer in a case of felony may use such
force as is necessary to capture the felon, even to killing him when in
flight. In the case of a misdemeanor, however, the rule is different.
It is his duty to make the arrest and he may summon a posse and may
defend himself, if resisted, even to the taking of life, but when the
offender is not resisting, but fleeing, has no right to kill. This is
the rule which has been and is foll9wed in Kentucky. Stephens v.
Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 544, 47 S. W. 229; Lindte v. Commonwealth, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1307, 64 S. W. 986; Head v. Martin,7 Ky. L. Rep.
361; Doolin v. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 29, 32 S. W. 663; Reed v. Crommonwealth, 125 Ky. 126, 100 S. W. 856; Terrell v. Commonwealth, 194
Ky. 608, 240 S. W. 81. A distinction between a case where one is attempting to avoid arrest, and where one is endeavoring to escape after
arrest has been attempted to be drawn, but the law applied* in each
case has been the same. In Lewis v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 652, 131
S. W. 517, it was said that a policeman has no right to shoot one arrested for a misdemeanor to prevent his escape. In Reed v. Commonwealth, supra, it was held that in arresting one guilty of a misdemeanor, the officer is never justified in killing merely to effect the
arrest, and this is true whether the offender be fleeing to avoid arrest
or to escape from custody. To kill in either case would be murder,
but under home circumstances it may amount only to manslaughter
where death was not intended. A life may be taken in an arrest for a
misdemeanor or preventing escape where the offender puts the life of
the officer in jeopardy. No greater force than is reasonable and apparently necessary should be used by the officer. There must be a reasonable and apparent danger of loss of life or bodily harm. Consequently
it can be seen from the above cited authorities that armed force is not
absolutely necessary. Reasonable and apparent fear of great bodily
harm will justify an officer in shooting.
The law on the point involved seems to be uniform throughout
the United States. An officer is under no duty to retreat and can repel
force with force. He is not justified in using unnecessary force or
resorting to the use of firearms or other dangerous weapons where
with diligence and caution the prisoner can be otherwise arrested and
detained. Kover v. State, 109 Ga. 485, 34 S. E. 1030; State v. Coleman,
136 Mo. 151, 84 S. W. 978; Reneau v. State, 31 Am. R. (Tenn.) 626;
State v. Finch, 177 N. C. 599, 99 S. E. 409; Birt v. State, 156 Ala. 29,
46 So. 858. In order for the homicide to be justified the resistance
offered must be such that in overcoming it and in making the arrest
or preventing the escape the officer is placed in danger of loss of life
or great bodily harm. Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 26 S. W. 712; Clements v. State, 50 Ala. 117; CommonweaZth v. Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. Ct.
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512; fState v. Hickey, 70 N. ". Law 623, 57 A. 264; Robertson v. Territory, 13 Ariz. 10, 108 P. 217, affirmed 188 F. 783; Ry. Mail Cess'n v.
Moseley, 211 F. L
W. C. W.

INSUANCE--CLAUSE LIMITNG LIABrLITy IN EVENT OF SEr=-DEsTnucTiON Dos NoT EXONERATE INSURER, 3:F INsURED DiD NoT RtxZE CoNssquB~cEs or His OwN ACT. Appellant insurance company had placed
in the insured's policy a clause limiting its liability in case of selfdestruction, regardless of whether insured was "sane or insane." The
insured a few months after taking out the policy committed suicide by
shooting himself through the head with a pistol. From an adverse
judgment in the lower court the appellant appeals. Held, that although
there was a clause in the insurance policy limiting liability In case of
self-destruction, whether insured was "sane or insane," the insurer
wouid not be exonerated, if the insured at the time of the act did not
realize or contemplate the consequences thereof, or that it would result
in death. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dean et al., 226 Ky. 597, 11
(2d) S. W. 417.
Where clauses have been placed in life insurance policies limiting
the liability of the insurer in the event of self-destruction whether the
Insured was "sane or insane," or where similar expressions have been
issued, the Court of Appeals has consistently placed the interpretation
upon such clauses as set forth in the principal opinion. Mutual Ben.
L. Ins. Co. v. Daviess, 87 Ky. 552, 9 S. W. 812; ManhattanLife Insurance Co. v. Beard, 112 Ky. 455, 66 S. W. 35, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1742; Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cockran, 187 Ky. 430, 219 S. W. 172; National
Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 194 Ky. 355, 239 S. W. 35, 35 A L. R. 156. Such
a clause in a policy, however, extends to intentional self-destruction
by an insane as well as by a sane person, regardless of the moral or
criminal quality of the act. Masonic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 121 Ky.
349, 123 Am. St. Rep. 198, 89 S. W. 219. Also, where the insured kills
himself as the result of an irresistible impulse which deprives him of
the abilitiy to "govern his actions, it does not avoid the effect of the
"sane or insane" clause in the policy. National Life Ins. Co. v. Watson,
supra.
The majority of jurisdictions, however, would avoid the insurer's
liability, although the insured was not conscious of the physical nature
and consequences of the act, and had no intention of killing himself,
and this whether sane or insane. Clarke v. Equitable Life Ins. Hoc.,
55 C. C. A. 200, 118 Fed. 374; Moor v. North Western Mt. Life Ins. Co.,
192 Mass. 468, 78 N. E. 488, 7 Am. Dec. 656; De Gorgorza v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Go., 35 N. Y. 232. (For other cases setting forth the
minority and majority holdings, see 35 A. L. R. 166 and 164.)
There is no question but that the Court of Appeals Is clearly with
the minority courts, but the decision in the principal case follows a
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line of cases of well considered reasoning, and in a case where exact
justice is to be done between the parties, it seems to be sound.
H. C. C.
INsuRA-cn-NcoMPLiANcE WITH INVENTORY AND InRoN SAFE
CLA1UGSE IN IiSURANC POrICY, COVERING SToCK O GOODS AND FIXTURES,
NoT A DEFENsE. Insured, the owner of a general merchandise store
Insured his stock of gopds and fixtures; the property was totally destroyed by fire while the policy was in force, but the insurer refused
to pay the loss on the ground that the inventory and iron safe clause
had not been complied with. Held, that the failure of the insured to
comply with such provisions was not a defense. Fidelity Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Hyden, 226 Ky. 246, 10 (2d) S. W. 829.
The insurer admitted that the ruling of the court was in line with
the established Kentucky rule but insisted that the rule rested upon
unsound principles and should be definitely overruled. The court, however, stated that the rule had become so well established as to have
become a rule of property which should not be overruled except for
overwhelming reasons. The court further said that even though the
rule might be founded upon unsound principles and be without support
in other jurisdictions, an attempt to reverse at this time would work
more hardship than good, since it would defeat many existing contracts of insurance.
This is the third case wherein the court has been asked to establish a different rule. Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Ehapoff,
179 Ky. 813, 201 S. W. 1116; London Guarantee and Accident Ins. Co.
v. Massm4n, 214 Ky. 688, 283 S. W. 1051.
This rule originated in the case of Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Angel, 18 Ky.
L. Rep. 1034, 38 S. W. 1067 (1897), and is to the effect that such provisions are without consideration, in no way decrease the risk and
at most would only tend to a better preservation of evidence,-to show
the amount of the loss, and it does not seem competent to contract with
the assured for the preservation of evidence in behalf of either party.
This rule has been approved time and again; thus in Mechanics and
Traders Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1538, 49 S. W. 543, the court
stated that it did not intend to recede from the rule.
However, beginning with the Shapoff case, supra, there has appeared an increasing dissatisfaction with the rule, until at the present
time, in the case at bar, the court for the first time becomes divided,
three joining in the dissent.
The dissent states that it has found no other American jurisdiction
which supports the Kentucky rule; this is well bourne out by Joyce, in
Law of Insurance, Vol. III, 2nd edition, section 2063a. The weight of
authority is in favor of holding such provisions to be promissory warranties. Continental Ins. Co. v. Rosenb)erg, 7 Perriewills (Del.) 174, 74
Atl. 1073; Aetna Ins. (o. v. Johnson, 127 Ga. 491, 5 S. E. 643. Other
states hold such to be mere representations. Goddard v. East Texas
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Fire Ins. Co., 67 Texas 69, 1 S. W. 906. Still other states consider such
to be conditions precedent. Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. v. Kneer, 72 Kansas
385, 83 Pac. 611; Rosenberg v. People's Surety Co., 125 N. Y. Supp. 257.
The federal courts and a few others conditions subsequent. Royal Ins.
Co. Ltd. v. Kline, 198 Fed. 468; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 121
Ala. 258, 25 So. 912. The Kentucky rule of course holds such to be a
condition subsequent, but not such as to destroy substantive rights.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals it is apparent realizes it stands
alone, and it has signified that it would be willing to accept a better
rule, but it is confronted with the doctrine of stare decisis. The court,
however, suggests that the legislature is better adapted to remedy the
situation and will probably wait for corrective legislation.
W. H. C.
MASTERB AND

SERVANT-WIFE,

Wuo Lum, IUSBAND'S

HoME TEMo-

nAnILY, PRIOR To TImE HusBAND WAS KIlLED, HELD NOT TO HAVE AnArDONED Him, PRECLUDING RIGHT TO COmpmE sATION.-The wife of a deceased employee filed claim before the Compensation Board. The appellant unsuccessfully resisted the claim on three grounds: (1) that the
claimant had voluntarily abandoned her husband at the time and was
not a dependent; (2) that the husband met his death by reason of his
wilful misconduct and while engaged in an act not in line with his employment; (3) that compensation should be reduced by 15% because
he was at the time violating a rule of the company. B.ack Mountain Corporationv. Higgins et al., 226 Ky. 7, 10 (2d) S. W. 463.
(1)
In the principal case the wife left her husband and went to
the home of her sister because her husband had accused her of illicit
relations with another. This is not abandonment for in- Mayes v.
Mayes, 115 S. W. 717 (Ky.), it is stated that merely leaving or departing
from a husband's abode, or from him, is not necessarily abandonment
in the statutory sense of the word, for the husband's conduct may be
such as to compel the wife to leave.
A wife is conclusively presumed dependent under the Compensation Act, unless otherwise shown as a fact, notwithstanding the acceptance of alimony. Jones v. Louisville Gas and Electric Co., 209
Ky. 642. An abandoned wife'was held conclusively presumed dependent,
notwithstanding illicit cohabitations. Layman-Calloway Coal Co. v.
Martin, 209 Ky. 690.
The relation of dependency existing at the time of employee's
death is to be determined in the light of prior events and is not to be
controlled by an unusual temporary situation, under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Fordson Coal Co. v. Burke, 219 Ky. 770 (1927). Dependency is a question of fact. Northwestern Iron Co. v. Industrial
Commission of Wisconsin (1913), 142 N. W. 271; Muncie Foundry and
Machine Co. v. Coffee (1917) 171 N. E. 527.
(2)
In the principal.case, the Compensation Board found that use
of a flat car to transport the welding machine, where the deceased had
been accustomed to use these fiat cars, was following the course of his
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employment and that his conduct was not a wilful disobedience of the
rules of the company. In Cogar Grain, Coal and Feed Co. v. Workmen's
Compensation Board, 195 Ky. 477, where the evidence was conflicting
upon the issue as to whether the accident arose out of and in the course
of the employment, the finding of the Compensation Board on that issue
Is conclusive under Sec. 4935, Kentucky Statutes.
In the Harlan Gas Coal Co. v. Trail, 213 Ky. 226, where an employee of a coal company, on his way to work, saw an electric wire
lying across a nearby path, and was killed in attempting to remove it,
though advised by his fellow workmen not to touch it, it was held that
death was not caused by wilful misconduct. Allen v. Columbus Mining
Co., 207 Ky. 183; Big Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Burke, -206 Ky. 489.
Compensation acts very generally contain a provision to the effect
that compensation shall not be awarded where it appears that the injury was due to the employee's wilful misconduct. Under the English
Compensation Act serious and wilful misconduct does not bar the right
to compensation for an injury resulting in death or serious or permanent disablement, provided the death or disablement were incident to
his employment. This differs from the Kentucky rule, and the rule
generally thruout the United States, because compensation for wilful
misconduct is not allowed where shown as a fact. Williams v. Llan.
duhno Coaching and Carriage Co., 2 K. B. 101 (1915).
(3)
In considering whether the rules of the company have been
violated to the extent that 15% should be taken from the award, Sections 4910 and 4882 should be construed together. Under the instant
case, Higgins was doing what he had been accustomed to do without
any direct rule -of the company giving him the authority. The Compensation Board held that he was not violating the rules of the company.
Under Section 4910, the Compensation Board may reduce compensation for death of an employee working in a dangerous place In
opposition to instructions from superiors, and in violation of the employer's rule, by 15%. Johnson v. Hardy-Burlingham Mining Co., 205
Ky. 752.
H. H. F.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WHERE

EMPLOYEE WAS INJURED DURING EM-

PLOYMENT AND TooK ODD JOBS SEVERAL WEEKS AND THEN RETuNED TO

EMPLOYMENT AND WAS KILLED ON DAY HE RETURNED,

CoMrENsATI0

COULD D3EALLOwED THOUGH HE DID NOT SIGN REGISTER AGAIN. (KENTUCKY STATUTES, SEcTIo 4957).-An employee, where both parties had
accepted the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Kentucky
Statutes, Sections 4880-4987), received an injury which resulted in
blood poisoning. He was laid off for some time, but drew compensation
while off duty. He worked at odd jobs, with the full knowledge of the
superintendent of the company, for a few weeks and then returned to
his work. He was killed on the day he returned. The Compensation
Board, on the finding of fact, awarded compensation to the parents who
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were dependent upon the deceased and another son. The company appealed. The court upheld the award of the Board. Pet Milk Co. v.
WVorkme's Compensation Board et al., 226 Ky. 16, 10 (2d) S. W. 455.
The question in this case was the fact that the employee did not
sign the register, accepting the compensation act, when he returned.
It was not questioned that he signed it the first time he went to work
for the company. Section 4957 of the Kentucky Statutes provides: "If
the employment be intermittent or be temporarily suspended the original acceptance of the employee shall continue effective in subsequent
employment under the same employer." The question as to whether
this employment was intermittent or temporary is one of fact for the
Board, and, if the evidence supports the Board in its decision, this decision will not be disturbed by the courts.
The general rule in Kentucky is that the finding of fact, in the
absence of fraud and where it is suporteed by evidence, by the Compensation Board, will not be disturbed. Pope Mining Company v.
Brown, 194 Ky. 714; Ames Body Corporation v. Vollman, 199 Ky. 358;
U. S. Coal and Coke Company v. Burrell, 205 Ky. 777; Employers'
Liability Assur. Corporationv. Gardner, 204 Ky. 216.
The accident resulting in death must arise out of or in the course
of the employment. GramisoW's Administrator v. Bates and Rogers
Construction Company, 187 Ky. 538; Palmer v. Main, 209 Ky. 226.
Even where the accidental death results within the scope of the
employment, the compensation will be paid. Barres v. Watterson Hotel
Company, 196 Ky. 100.
The other states follow -the Kentucky rule as to finding of fact.
If there is substantial or credible evidence supporting the finding of
the Commission, the court will not interfere. Milwaukee Coke and
Gas Company v. Industrial Commission, 160 Wis. 247. The Wisconsin
law follows that of Kentucky closely in this respect. International
Harvester Company v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wisconsin 167;
Sexton v. Newark District Telegraph Company, 84 N. 3. Law 85.
H. H. F.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-ESTALISHED

HIGHWAY

IN

RuRAL.

Dis-

TRIcT AuTomATicALLY BEcomsuS HIGHWAY OF Towr WHEN TERRITORY IS
mEmBRACED WITHIN TowN's BOUNI'DAIES.-T. owned two houses within
a city where she carried on a general mercantile business and a feed
and grain store. Defendant railroad company's right of way crossed
this street and, in making some repairs on the said right of way, obstructed the street to T.'s damage. T. contended that although this
street had for thirty years prior to the incorporaion of the city been
only a passway over which the public went to and from the county
seat, that on incorporation it became a street over which the authorities had control and that thereby the railroad became liable. Held,
that the passway automatically became a street. Tolliver v. L. & V.
R. Co., 226 Ky. 132, 10 (2d) S. W. 623.
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The principle of the instant case, that when territory not embraced
in a town becomes territory which is a part of the town, the established
highways, passways, roads, and streets which the public hdd acquired
the right to use automatcailly become highways within the town, and
remain such until -they are abolished by the town in some legal manner, is the recognized view on the point in Kentucky. It was first laid
down in Rowan's Ex'rs v. PortZand,8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 232 (1847), which
Is the leading case and has been many times cited. In that case the
court held that were the rule otherwise no person could afford to buy
a lot in a proposed subdivision of a town which had been plotted off,
for the reason that he could have no certainty of access to it, and the
purpose of the scheme of bringing property, into use by an urban population might be entirely defeated. When a street has been dedicated
in this way, the city mdy accept it when it gets ready, and in the meantime the owners of the lots calling for the streets are estopped, not
only as against the city but other property owners, to say that the
ground is not a street. In Creekmore v. Central Construction Co., 157
Ky. 336, 163 S. W. 194, the principle of the instant case was enunciated verbatim. In City of Paducahv. Mallory, 9 (2d) S. W. 1015; Volpenneim v. Westerfelf, 216 Ky. 157, 287 S. W. 545; Morris v. Avondale
Heighs Co., 218 Ky. 356, 291 S. W. 752; Morrison v. Town of West Point,
219 Ky. 397, 292 S. W. 1095, there was a change in the form and statement of the princile involved, and here being discussed. No formal
action is necessary on the city's part for the annexation of a county
road as a street. City of Louisville v. Brewer's Adm'r, 24 Ky. Law Rep.
1671, 72 S. W. 9; City of Ashland v. Cummins, 194 Ky. 645, 240 S. W. 63.
The court in Gernet v. City of Louisville, 155 Ky. 589, 159 S. W. 1163,
held, when the boundaries of a municipalty are extended, property
thus included in the extension stands on the same footing as any other
property and public highways thus embraced become ipso facto streets
of the city.
The other jurisdictions vary somewhat from the doctrine of the
Kentucky cases. Where there was a common law dedication of land
to an unincorporated town, which subsequently became incorporated,
the rights acquired by the public under the dedication became vested
in the municipality. The general rule is that it is for the city to determine whether the public roads in that city shall or shall not become
thoroughfares in the city and if they so determine, said public roads
then become streets of the city. Marsh v. Village of Fairbury,163 Ill.
401, 45 N. E. 236; Benton v. State, 168 Ala. 175, 52 So. 842. When a public highway enters an incorporated town or such town builds on one already existent, it usually follows that the highway or so much of it as
is within the corporate limits comes under the regulation and control
of the corporation authorities as a part of the public streets. In the
absence of constitutional restraints these authorities may have power
to vacate or discontinue a street or public way, but when such street
has been once established they can only do so by legislative sanction
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expressly or impliedly given. Whether a county road becomes a street
when included within the corporate limits of a city depends upon the
intention of the legislature, as gathered from the city charter, general
laws, and the whole course of legislation on the subject. Oliver v. City
of 2 Tewbury, 1 P. 470, 50 Or. 92; State v. Com7rs Putman Co., 23 Fla.
632, 3 So. 164.
W. C. W.

PowERs-DEED BY WiDow HOLDING LIFE ESTATE WITH PowER Or
DIsPosiTioN AMONG ANY OF TEsTATOn'S CHILDREN, MADE IN EXECUTIOmN
OF THE PowEa, DID NOT REQUIRE WIDow's THEN HUSBAND TO JOIN IN ITS
EXECUTION TO BE VALID.-Testator died leaving by will a life estate in
all his property, both real and personal, to his widow, with a power
of disposition amongst testator's children. The widow married again,
and afterwards executed a conveyance of the realty to her son, who
conveyed to another, who conveyed to appellee. All the appellants,
who are the children of the testator, joined in the execution of the
deed from the widow. After the land came into possession of the appellee, oil was discovered thereon and the appellants bring this action
contending among other things that the widow could not convey good
title to the property without joining her then husband in the conveyance. Held, that where widow is entitled to life estate with power to
dispose of land to any of the testator's children, and in pursuance of
the power a deed is executed to one of the children, it is not necessary
to the validity of the deed that the then husband join in the conveyance. Shaver et al. v. Bllis et al., 226 Ky. 806, 11 (2d) :S. W. 949.
The Kentucky law is well settled that a feme covert having a power
of appointment may exercise the power without the husband joining
in the execution. Tyre v. Williams, 3 Bibb 365, 6 Am. Dec. 663; Meeks
v. Robards, 157 Ky. 199, 162 S. W. 318. This law appears to be pretty
general throughout the other jurisdictions. Stearns v. Fraleigh, 39
Fla. 603, 23 So. 18, 39 L. R. A. 705; Michael v. Baker, 12 Md. 158, 71
Am. Dec. 593; Cranston v. Crane, 97 Mass. 459, 23 Am. Dec 106; Leigh
v. Smith, 38 N. C. 442, 42 Am. Dec. 182.
Statutes prescribing a mode in which a married woman may convey
her real estate do not effect the capacity which she had at the common
law to exercise a power in pursuance of an instrument settling property on her. Antonini v. Straub, 130 Ky. 10, 112 S. W. 1092, 132 A. S.
R. 350; Young v. Sheldon, 139 Ala. 444, 36 So. 27, 101 A. S. R. 44. The
court construes such statutes as mere enabling acts, which do not disable the wife from executing an authority which she could exercise at
the common law. Antonini v. Straub, supra.
The reason for the rule that the married woman exercising a power
of appointment may convey without joining her husband is that the act
is deemed that of the donor of the power rather than that of the donee.
Osgood v. Bliss, 141 Mass. 474, 6 N. E. 527, 55 Am. Rep. 488; Stearns v.
Fraeigh,39 Fla. 603, 23 So. 18, 39 L. R. A. 705. And it Is not material
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that the woman is unmarried at the time the power is given and afterwards marries, or whether she is already married and survives her
husband and takes another, as in any case she may exercise the power
alone. Thompson v. Perry, 2 Hill Ch. (S. C.) 204, 29 Am. Dec. 68.
These decisions would clearly indicate that the court's holding in
the principal case is based on a well settled common law rule and is in
accord with the holdings of the courts throughout the other jurisdictions.
H. C. C.

VENDOR AND

PURcHASER-UNDER DEED NOT RECITING THE AmOUq

RECITING THAT LIEN WAS RETAINED,
HAD No LIEN AS AGAINST JUDGMENT CanDITop--A and B, hus-

OF CONSIDERATIONI UNPAID, BUT

VENDOR

band and wife, conveyed by deed certain land. The consideration
stated in the deed was "one dollar and other considerations of value,
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged." Following this
were these words, "A lien is retained to secure the payment of
the unpaid purchase money." An execution was levied on the land
for a debt to the defendant. A having died, B, his administratrix,
brought this action to recover the unpaid purchase money represented
by notes, which she claimed were secured by the lien on the land, and
that this was superior to the execution lien of the defendant. The case
is governed by a statute (Ky. St. 2358) which provides that there shall
be no lien unless the amount of unpaid purchase money be stated. Held,
that the above clause, "A lien is retained . . . purchase money,"
does not satisfy the statute and hence is not a lien as against bona fide
creditors or purchasers, such as the defendant. Stephens' Adm'x v.
Union Central Life Insurance Co., 226 Ky. 233 10 (2d) S. W. 833.
The construction of the statute was settled at an early date and
has been followed in later cases. The object of the statute was to
secure purchasers against the lien of some previous vendor, the existence of which did not appear by the deed which he had executed. A
strict interpretation has been given, such that, if the deed does not
expressly state the amount unpaid there can be no lien, though a general notice is expressed. And execution of a deed without this definite
expression, amounts in law to a waiver of the vendor's lien. Chapman
v. Stockwell, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 650 (1857). There have been extremely
few Kentucky cases involving this point, but decisions from some other
states which have practically the, same provisions in the statute may
be found. It has been held that in a deed which contained, among
other clauses, "That in consideration of $500 secured to be paid and
of $5 cash paid, etc.," there was not such a statement as would constitute an express reservation of a lien on the land as required by the
statute. Harrisv. Shields Ex'r et al., 111 Va. 643, 69 S. E. 933 (1911).
The statement, "And secured to be paid by vendor's lien note," was
held a mere recital in the deed, showing that part of the purchase
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money is evidenced by notes described therein, and does not retain a
vendor's lien. Proetzel v. abeZ et al., 21 Tex. Civ. App. 559, 54 S. W.
373 (1899).
These statutes, followed by a strict Interpretation of them, seem
to effect somewhat of an improvement of the conditions concerning a
sale wherein part of the purchase money is unpaid at the time. Much
uncertainty as to the extent of the lien exists when it Is not definitely
stated on the face of the deed the amount unpaid. Not only is the purchaser caused to make considerable inquiry but if any action is brought
on the transaction it will be necessary to admit evidence which can
not be found in the deed, thus permitting more opportunity for disagreement and misunderstanding. Much that is uncertain can be made
certain by a clear and concise statement as to the exact amount unpaid.
From the words used in the statute, according to their general meaning, this seems to have been the intention of the law-makers. In the
past mere notice of the existence of a lien had been sufficient and to
avoid this the provision was placed in the statute requiring a more
definite statement. From the words used, it is difficult to see how any
H. E. N.
other than a strict interpretation could be given.
WImLs-PAPEn WnRI
sy

WrrNEssEs HELD NoT

ENTILy By TYPEwnn AND UNSUBSCRIBED
IN "HANDWRITING OF TESTATOR,"

AND HENCE

IxvALiD As Wmin. (Ky. ST., Sec. 4828). Testator was killed in a railroad
accident. At time of his death there was found on his person a typewritten instrument in the form of a will which was signed by him.
There were no witnesses to the will. Each of his two sons and his
wife testified that about four months previous to his death he announced his intention of making his will; that he went into an adjoining room to his typewriter and started writing. None of them were
close enough to or did actually see what he was writing. His wife
testified that after he had finished writing he handed her one of two
typewritten sheets of paper and stated that it was a carbon copy of his
will which he wished her to keep. A judgment of the county court
admitting the instrument to probate was reversed by the circuit court
and the proponents appeal. Held, the instrument is not valid as a
will, not being in' the handwriting of the testator as required by Kentucky Statutes, Section 4828. Adams' Er'r et al. v. Beaumont, 226 Ky.
311, 10 (2nd) S. W. 1106.
In a number of states a testamentary paper wholly in the handwriting of the testator is a valid will without attesting and subscribing witnesses. States admitting tQ probate holographic wills are
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Kentucky. Woerner, American Law of Administration, 3rd Ed.,
Vol. I, sec. 43. A "holographic" will is one entirely written, dated and
signed by the testator in his own handwriting. In re Noyes, 40 Mont.
190, 105 Pac. 1017, 20 Ann. Cas. 366, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1145. The
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validity of such a will owes its origin to the fact that a successful
counterfeit of another's handwriting is exceedingly difficult, and that
therefore the requirement that It shquld be in the testator's handwriting would afford protection against a forgery of this character. In re
Dreyfus, 175 Cal. 417, 165 Pac. 941, L. R. A. 1917f 391.
The Kentucky Statutes, Section 4828, provide that such a will, to
be valid, must be "wholly" written by the testator. The first Kentucky
case involving such a will was Hannah v. Peakce, 2 A. K. Marsh. 133,
which held that a will written wholly by the testator, but in a disguised hand, satisfied the statute and should be admitted to probate.
The few Kentucky cases interpreting Section 4828 are uniform in holding that such a will, to be valid, must be written wholly in the handwriting of the testatbr. Porter v. Ford, 82 Ky. 191; Rutledge v. Wigginton et al., 166 Ky. 421, 179 S. W. 389.
A leading case, decidedly in point, is that of In re Dreyfus, supra,
where it was held that a will written on a typewriter does not comply
with the requirements of a statute that a holographic will shall be
entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator, and
is therefore not admissible to probate as such a will. A valid holographic will must be in the handwriting of the testator. Alexander v.
Johnson, 171 N. C. 468, 88 S. E. 785. And, a will on printed form, with
the blanks filled in the handwriting of the deceased is not holographic.
Estate of Rand (1882) 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555; 'Wolcott v. Brod:
beck, (1919) 54 Utah 165, 180 Pac. 169, 4 A. L. R. 727; Rood on Wills,
(2nd Ed.) sec. 270. In the case of Thorn's Estate, 183 Cal. 512, 192
Pac. 19, it was held that a will was not holographic where words forming a part of the will, though superfluous, were inserted with a rubber
stamp. But in Gooch v. Gooch, 113 S. E. 873 (Va.), it was decided that
though a codicil was written on a printed form, where the part which
was wholly in the testator's handwriting and signed by him was complete and entire in itself, the printed portions might be disregarded
and the will admitted to probate as a holographic codicil. The Louisiana, California and Montana statutes require that a holographic will
be dated, and it has been held in those jurisdictions that the statute
is not complied with if any part of the date is printed. Robertson's
Succession, 49 La. Ann. 868; Billing's Estate, 64 Cal. 427; In re Noyes'
Estate, supra.
The decision in the instant case is in line with the weight of
authority involving the interpretation of similar statutes and while
in exceptional cases the true intention of the testator may not be carried out, it is perfectly obvious that a more liberal interpretation would
lead to such fraud, perjury, and forgery as to defeat the very purpose
for which the statute was enacted.
C. E. B.

